Do sanctions strengthen the targeted regime? I analyze the 2014 imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and its impact on voting. The US and the EU introduced targeted measures against Russian entities and individuals related to Putin's regime. Using polling station-level data I investigate whether Putin gained relatively more support among those local constituencies which were geographically close to a sanctioned firm. I find a significant effect of targeted sanction imposition on the vote share in presidential elections between 2012 and 2018. Putin gained 1.54 percentage points at those polling stations that had a sanctioned firm in immediate vicinity. Targeted sanctions imposition also affected voter turnout. The effect on voting can be explained as rally-around-the-flag in the face of sanctions, as long as voters did not endure economic losses through a decline in some sanctioned firms' economic performance.
Introduction
Do sanctions have an unaccounted for effect of strengthening the sanctioned regime? According to the public choice literature, sanctions can reduce the political resources of the ruling elites in the target country, thereby changing the domestic political equilibrium and bringing about a change in policy in the direction aimed by the sanction senders (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988) . Specifically, the regime's opposition may be encouraged by foreign sanctions and their ability to mobilize people to collective actions against the government may increase, or regime supporters may turn away from the target country rulers in anticipation of a regime change (Kaempfer et. al., 2004) . Alternatively, sanction imposition may induce the target country's citizens to reject foreign inference by increasing their support for the rulers and thereby reinforcing the sanctioned policy or behavior, a phenomenon termed "rally-around-the-flag" (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992) . Aware of these potential unintended consequences, sanction policymakers in the last two decades have started applying so-called "smart" or "targeted" sanctions, i.e., sanction programs which meticulously target only a country's ruler and her closest supporters (Tostensen, 2002; Drezner, 2011) .
Understanding the impact of this new type of sanctions is of interest not only for sanctions policymakers and the sanctions literature but also for models of political support and state legitimacy. And for those taking the decisions on sanctions, if smart sanctions increase the popular support of a targeted government, then sanctions in general may turn out to be an obsolete, ineffective foreign policy tool.
In this paper, I empirically examine the effect of smart sanctions on the targeted country. In 2014, the EU and the US introduced sanctions against several hundreds of Russian entities and individuals. I investigate the political consequences of these Direct exposure to local sanctioned entities may have given rise to an identity-or economic-based reaction. The local presence of sanctioned firms may have induced defiant attitudes against foreign influence and awakened or strengthened ideas of nationalism or identity from which Putin's support benefits (Pape, 1997) . At the same time, sanctioned entities may have contributed to worsening local economic conditions, for which Western interference could be blamed. This paper analyzes whether exposure to smart sanctions affects political support for the targeted regime. To do so, I assemble a panel of newly-collected polling station-level data on presidential elections and match it with geographical and financial data on sanctioned Russian firms. I then compare the change in Putin's vote share between 2012 and 2018 for the polling stations that had a sanctioned firm in close vicinity after 2014's sanctions imposition to those polling stations that did not. I find that local presence of a sanctioned firm significantly increased Putin's vote share in the 2018 presidential elections by 1.54 percentage points. Since more than 11,000 polling stations (out of over 90,000) were close to at least one sanctioned firm in the 2018 elections, the estimated effect implies over 280,000 influenced voters.
In a second part of the analysis, I show that the effect of a nearby sanctioned firm varies with local support for Putin. The effect is particularly strong at those polling stations that are the most and the least supportive of Putin. Additionally, the presence of a sanctioned firm increased voter turnout at those polling stations where Putin enjoyed highest support. The impact of sanctions on voters seems to work, at least in part, through mobilization of nonvoters in pro-Putin areas. Pinpointing the precise mechanism that drives up Putin's support at polling stations close to sanctioned firms is challenging due to the lack of disaggregated data on voter attitudes. To confront this challenge, this paper uses firm-level data on employment at sanctioned firms between 2013 and 2017. I show that the sanctioned firm effect on voting is only present for those firms that gain additional employees over the sanctions period. The effect for sanctioned firms losing employees over the same period is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. This may be taken as an indication that an identity-or nationalism-based explanation for Putin's support is subordinate to a rational economic explanation. When sanctions affect one's livelihood and economic prosperity, Russians may be less eager to see the blame in foreign interference and to rally-around-the-flag.
My paper contributes to the literature on the domestic political impact of sanctions.
One strand of this literature has found that sanctions lead to popular mobilization against the regime in the target country and policy reversal or step-down of the regime (Kirshner, 1997; Mack and Khan, 2000; Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Marinov, 2005) . These findings have been questioned by contributions that demonstrate that the impact of sanctions, especially on autocratic regimes, is probably weak (Galtung, 1967; Lektzian and Souva, 2007, Allen, 2008; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010) . Nondemocratic regimes are able to mitigate the domestic political costs of sanctions by increasing government spending or taking repressive measures.
These empirical studies typically use a cross-country or a case-study approach and are plagued by endogeneity problems, particularly in isolating the effect of sanctions on domestic politics from other concurrent dynamics or factors. I improve on these existing contributions by providing causal identification of the impact of sanctions on the target country's electoral outcomes.
My paper is also related to the small but growing literature on targeted sanctions. Dreger et al. (2015) and Tuzova and Qayub (2016) use VAR models in an attempt to estimate the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy. Moret et al.
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(2016) and Ahn and Ludema (2016) examine the change in trade flows between Russia and the rest of the world following sanction imposition. Whereas these studies give a fundamental macroeconomic perspective on how sanctions may play out across the economies involved in sanctions, they may be less well-suited to measure the impact of targeted sanctions, which are mostly affecting only specific entities or at most specific sectors of an economy. In this regard, Crozet and Hinz (2016) , Haidar (2017) , Ahn and Ludema (2017) and Draca et. al. (2017) take up a micro-level approach in determining the impact of sanctions on trade flows or economic performance of the sanctioned firms or sectors. Some of the findings support that smart sanctions have been able to negatively impact the performance of the entities connected to the business and political elites in Russia and Iran (Ahn and Ludema 2017; Draca et. al., 2017 ). Yet, Crozet and Hinz (2016) and Haidar (2017) use customs data to demonstrate that recent targeted sanctions have also had unintended consequences of deflecting trade flows, particularly in the cases of Russia and Iran. I build upon this micro-data-based research agenda on exploration of the impact of sanctions in the following ways. First, I compile firm-level data on sanctioned firms and polling-station-level data across presidential elections in order to explore the precise working-out of Western sanctions in Russia. Second, I complement the existing contributions, which focus on real economic performance of the sanctioned entities, whereas my paper draws implications for the sanction effectiveness in terms of their political consequences. This is important because, ultimately, whether sanctions work comes down to whether or not the targeted regime changes its behavior. In this regard, the economic losses endured by the target may prove a mixed blessing -it is both possible that the regime is split or that its support is reinforced (Kaempfer et. al., 2004 targeted sanctions may be able to divide the masses from the elite who is to be punished and achieve their intended goal (Freedman, 1998) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief background on Western sanctions imposition against Russia starting 2014. In section 3 I describe the data whereas section 4 presents the empirical specification, the results and robustness checks. Section 5 expands the analysis to heterogeneity effects and potential mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
Sanctions background
In 2013 Most of the sanctioned firms are small to mid-sized firms, with three-quarters of the firms with less than 1,000 employees in 2013 (Table 2) . The distribution of sanctioned firm size across the largest (Moscow and St.
Petersburg) and the smallest cities is similar, with a prevalence of small and midsized sanctioned companies, whereas most of the largest sanctioned firms are located in cities of population between 100,000 and 2,000,000 (Table 3) . To assess the effect of a sanctioned firm on local voters' support for Putin, I would ideally interview local voters on their political attitudes, prior and after the sanctioning of local firms. Unfortunately, this kind of information at such level of geographic detail is not available. I therefore use spatial vicinity of a local constituency to a sanctioned firm as a proxy for exposure. From the data described above, I construct several treatment variables. The main one identifies all polling stations which have one (or more) sanctioned firm within a radius of 10 km. There are 11,068 polling stations that were treated with at least one nearby sanctioned firm.
In robustness checks I vary this distance to include only very close (within 3 km) or also more faraway-located (within 60 km) sanctioned firms. In addition, I construct a treatment variable which accounts for the potential economic intensity of treatment. In particular, I draw a radius of 10 km around each polling station and sum the number of employees at sanctioned firms within this distance. I then relate this number to the total population in the subregion in which the particular polling station is located. I thus have a measure giving me the ratio of local population employed at sanctioned firms.
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Control variables
The polling stations are organized in electoral districts, which match Russian subregions. The subregion is the lowest administrative level at which data is collected by Rosstat, the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. I collect demographic data from Rosstat's website 5 for all 2,351 subregions, which in most cases is available for the period 2009-2017. The variables that provide enough coverage are total population, as well as population shares according to age, gender, social benefits recipients and urbanization. To account for potential economic confounders that may influence both the location of a sanctioned firm and political support for Putin, I also collect several economic performance controls. These include goods and services produced, state investment in fixed assets, and average wage, all at the subregional level, provided by Rosstat. Table 4 presents summary statistics of the election, demographic and economic data.
Summary statistics
I compare polling stations that featured a sanctioned firm within 10 km distance (column(2)) to polling stations that did not (column (1)). Those polling stations with a sanctioned firm are located in economically stronger subregions: average wages are higher, as is state investment per capita and the value of goods and services produced. The subregions in which the sanctioned polling stations are located are more than six times larger and almost exclusively urban (96.18% urban population). 
Empirical specification and results
I estimate the effect of having a sanctioned firm in close vicinity on voting behavior using a difference-in-difference approach. The treatment received by voters at a given polling station is the availability of a sanctioned firm within 10 km distance from the polling station. Measuring the effect of sanctioned firms involves comparing the changes in voting behavior of the electorate at polling stations where a firm is sanctioned after 2014 relative to the differences in voting behavior at those polling stations where no firm is sanctioned after 2014.
The difference-in-difference approach guards against certain threats to identification of the treatment effect. Looking at the differences in vote share across time assures that time-invariant characteristics of the polling station or the voters cannot be the reason for the change in voting behavior. Moreover, any time-varying effects are also controlled for by comparing the change in vote share between treated and untreated polling stations. Hence, the comparison of the change in the treatment group relative to the control group allows me to distill the effect of the treatment. In order to be able to attribute the difference in changes between the two groups as the effect of sanctioned firms, the treatment has to be unconditionally or conditionally (based on controls) exogenous. Specifically, the US and the EU should not have sanctioned The treatment variable, 10 , is a dummy variables, measured at the polling stations level and equal to one if there is at least one sanctioned firm within 10 km of the polling station; and equal to zero otherwise. To examine the determinants of the assignment to treatment, I estimate the following linear probability model: The results of this estimation are presented in Table 5 . In column (1) While sanctioned firms tend to be present in more urban and economically vibrant areas (see Table 1 ), the assignment to polling stations within a subregion is plausibly random. In the last column (5) I examine the impact of voting trends prior treatment on the predictability of sanctioned firm occurrence. 
Similar to the specification examining the determinants of sanctioned firm availability, I again control for subregion-level demographic and economic characteristics in levels ( , ) and in changes ( , ). I weight the observations by the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in 2012 and cluster the standard errors at the subregion level. (1)- (3)) and is positive, statistically significant and sizable, at 1.54%. 
Robustness
In the following, I test the robustness of the above results to alternative definitions of the treatment variable as well as to placebo treatments.
Up to now, the definition of the treatment variable -exposure to a sanctioned firm -was fixed to a radius of ten kilometers around the polling station. This choice has been guided by the average commuting distance from one's home to work. Yet, my Petersburg. These are cities that attract commuters from afar while also featuring denser presence of sanctioned firms than any other locations in the sample. The effect of the existence of a sanctioned firm might have thus spilled over to more distant neighboring areas. Finally, it is reassuring to see that the main result remains valid and statistically significant with the very tight definition of exposure to treatment of 3 km (column (2)). Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin's vote share for the 2018 presidential election) -(Putin's vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The variables "Sanctioned firm within 60 km" and "Sanctioned firm within 3 km" are binary variables that equal one if a sanctioned firm is within 60 km or 3 km distance from a polling station, respectively. The variable "Share of subregion population (%), working at sanctioned firm(s) within 10 km in 2012" measures the percentage share of the population of the subregion, to which the polling station belongs to, that works at sanctioned firms located in 10 km vicinity of the specific polling station in 2012. Data on employment at sanctioned firms was put together from Bureau van Dijk's AMADEUS database. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present The negative effect can also be explained by the unavailability of address information 
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Magnitude of the effect
My benchmark specification indicates that the presence of a sanctioned firm within 10 km distance of a polling station had a significant impact on Putin's vote share in the 2018 presidential elections. The benchmark estimate from Table 5 , column (4) implies a confidence interval of (0 . 
Heterogeneous effects
I examine how the sanctioned firm effect interacts with the political positions of local constituencies. In order to do so, I split the polling stations into thirds, depending on their support for Putin in the 2018 presidential elections. I then interact the treatment dummy for sanctioned firm within 10 km with the bottom and the top third of pro-Putin-voting polling stations. Table 9 reports the results from this estimation. Both interaction terms are positive and statistically significant -the impact of a sanctioned firm is higher not only in those communities that are most supportive of Putin but also across those polling stations where Putin enjoys the least support. These results imply that the imposition of a sanction on a local firm not only increases the support for the regime among supporters but also convinces previous opponents to vote pro-Putin.
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Did sanctions help Putin? Next, I test how locality characteristics influence the effect of a sanctioned firm on voting behavior. Most of the sanctioned firms are situated in Moscow and St.
Petersburg (60% of all sanctioned firms) and these two cities are quite distinct in 
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29 terms of political trends from the rest of Russia. For example, the two megacities show the highest levels of support for oppositional parties (Dmitriev and Treisman, 2012; Lankina and Voznaya, 2015) . To check whether there are any differences in the impact of the availability of a nearby sanctioned firm on voting behavior between Moscow and St. Petersburg and the rest of Russia, I subset the sample along these two geographic groups. The results, which are reported in 
Voter mobilization or vote swings?
Up until now, I have shown that sanctioned firms led to rise in support for Putin.
However, this observation alone does not explain how Putin's increased success came about. In what follows, I examine whether the approval came from other parties' voters switching to United Russia (the party Putin is affiliated with), or from new voters that were attracted to cast their vote following the sanction imposition.
It is possible that business and political elites who backed the regime and who were among the owners or managers of the sanctioned firms tried to mobilize local nonvoters to vote in favor of Putin. Indeed, there were several reports of "corporate mobilization" attempts across Russian state-owned enterprises, which were supposedly charged with the task to get out the votes. 8 To test whether the significant impact of sanctioned firms comes from voter mobilization or voter switches, I employ the following voter turnout specification:
, , , as well as for the usual economic and demographic characteristics of subregions.
Comparing polling stations with and without a sanctioned firm within 10 km distance suggests that these voter mobilization groups may have been successful in attracting new voters. Putin at the polling station, I find evidence that the turnout effect is quite strong and statistically significant at those polling stations that are most in favor of Putin.
Combining this finding with the evidence from Table 9 implies that sanction imposition urged nonvoters at pro-Putin polling stations to vote for Putin. 
Potential mechanism
The literature examining voters' support for Putin puts forward several explanations.
One strand of research maintains the economic performance hypothesis, i.e., the Russian public assesses the performance of the political elite based on objective economic performance measures (Rose, Mishler and Munro, 2011; Treisman, 2011) .
Others underline the importance of control over media in Russia as well as the active hindrance of political challengers eager to join the political system (Enikolopov et. al., 2011 (Enikolopov et. al., , 2016 Robertson, 2017) . In exploring the attitudinal changes of the electorate under extraordinary conditions one could distill the most likely foundations of a regime support. Sanctions imposition provide a useful opportunity to test whether in moments of international crisis Russians are prone to "rallyaround-the-flag".
In order to discern between competing explanations for the increased support of Putin at polling stations featuring a sanctioned firm, I devise the following test. I collect employment data for the sanctioned firms, before and after the imposition of sanctions. 9 For every polling station, featuring more than one sanctioned firm within 10 km distance, I aggregate the number of employees of all the nearby sanctioned firms. I then split the treated polling stations in two groups -those where in sum, sanctioned firms within 10 km have gained additional employees between 2013 and 2017, and those where the sanctioned firms (in sum) have lost employees over the same period.
, ,
9 Employment data for Russian firms is provided by Bureau van Dijk, AMADEUS database.
Equation (4) is identical to the baseline specification with exception of the treatment variable, which is now split into treated polling stations where employment at sanctioned firms rose between 2013 and 2017, 10 , .
, and those polling stations where employment at sanctioned firms declined during the same period, 10 , .
. By separately estimating the effects of winning and losing sanctioned firms, I can check whether the electorate blindly rallies around the flag or if it responds rationally to economic forces. Table 12 shows that only those sanctioned firms that continued to perform well after sanction imposition increase the vote share for Putin. The estimated coefficient for the sanctioned firms that lost employees between 2013 and 2017 is negative, albeit insignificant. Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin's vote share for the 2018 presidential election) -(Putin's vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The variable "Employment gain at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013" measures the log gain in employment at sanctioned firms within 10 km distance from the polling station, between 2013 and 2017. The variable "Employment loss at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013" measures the log loss in employment at sanctioned firms within 10 km distance from the polling station, between 2013 and 2017. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
These outcomes are meaningful in discerning the reasons for the longevity of Putin's leadership in Russia. The results imply that support for the government is subject to positive economic performance. Russians do not blindly "rally-around-the-flag".
Even in hybrid regimes politicians are held accountable for the economic performance of the country. Exposure to a sanctioned firm is associated with higher levels of support for Putin, but only when those firms continue to perform well under the sanctions regime.
My empirical analysis provides several principal findings. First, I find evidence that exposure to a sanctioned firm is associated with increased levels of support for Putin.
Moreover, I established that there has been a mobilization of nonvoters as well as switch of voters from the anti-Putin polling stations voting in favor of Putin in the 2018 elections, when there was a nearby sanctioned firm. This evidence is supportive of the "rally-around-the-flag" hypothesis, but as this section shows, it is an insufficient explanation. Specifically, sanctioned firms' performance measured by the percentage change in total employees between 2013 and 2017 is a strong and statistically significant predictor of higher support for Putin at the treated polling stations. The loyalty and increased support of the constituency is not irrational but involves sustained economic performance. I interpret these effects as supportive of the economic performance hypothesis (Rose, Mishler and Munro, 2011; Treisman, 2011) .
Conclusion
This paper studies the political consequences of targeted sanction imposition on The findings have implications for understanding the impact of modern-day "smart" sanctions that were introduced precisely with the goal to affect only specific groups related to the ruling elite and prevent unintended consequences. Notes: The unit of observation is the subregion. The dependent variable is (United Russia's vote share for the 2012 presidential election) -(United Russia's vote share for the 2008 presidential election). The variable "Sanctioned firm within subregion" is a binary variable that equals one if a sanctioned firm is located within the boundaries of the subregion. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by region. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the subregion level in the 2012 presidential election. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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